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ABSTRACT
This paper explores several issues regarding the treatment and care for patients suffering
from dementia, including a discussion of the relatively low time and money spent on
dementia research compared to research on cancer and cardio-vascular diseases. It also
discusses the special relationship between the person suffering from dementia and their
caregiver, who is often a loved one. The paper employs principlism and so examines
these issues from a consideration of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and
justice.
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INTRODUCTION
This paper explores several issues regarding the treatment and care for patients suffering
from dementia, including a discussion of the relatively little time and money spent on
dementia research compared to research on other diseases such as cancer and cardiovascular diseases. It will also discuss the special relationship between the person
suffering from dementia and their caregiver, who is often a loved one. The paper employs
principlism and so examines these issues from a consideration of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice (Beauchamp and Childress, 2012).
Like many others, my interest in dementia arose because a loved one, my father,
contracted the disease, which eventually killed him. Looking back, he probably had
Alzheimer’s long before it was diagnosed. Our family thought he was (merely)
depressed, which of course he was, but his depression was actually an effect of the fact
that he was beginning to lose his mind. Misdiagnoses, or late diagnoses of Alzheimer’s
and other forms of dementia is very common and arises in part because there is no good
physiological test for dementia, which I will discuss further later in the paper.1 Also
common is the difficulty of watching a loved one deteriorate from dementia. Of course,
seeing any loved one ill is difficult, but there is something uniquely disquieting about
1

Fortunately, this situation may soon change as a group of researchers (Nakamora et al., 2018) have
currently had great success in developing a blood test for early detection of Alzheimer’s disease.

seeing someone become increasingly unable to think or remember clearly and,
essentially, turn into someone else entirely.
Let me begin by setting out a caveat. I offer no definitive answers here. Ethics in
general very rarely finds such answers, and this is particularly true of dementia I think
both because of the nature of the disease, and because ethical reflection on dementia is
still relatively new. In fact, in Dementia: Ethical Issues, to which my discussion owes a
great deal, the Nuffield Council on Bioethics has said that “specific guidelines, rules, and
laws have a particular but limited role to play: they may help to set a framework pointing
to ways in which problems may be resolved but they can rarely provide a definitive
answer to a specific dilemma.” This may sound disappointing, but I also suspect that for
those who have loved and/or cared for someone with dementia, there is a clear truth in his
or her claim. So much of the caregiver’s work here depends on judgment in a particular
situation in the context of a particular person and the stage of their dementia at that
particular time. Attempting to apply abstract rules outside of this context could be very
counterproductive.
This raises the issue of the caregiver. Because of the nature of the disease, people
with dementia require a lot of care, and family and friends in the home often provide this
care. Any discussion of the ethical issues of treating people with dementia will have to
pay close attention to these caregivers. When we do so, what we often find is that
caregivers are rarely faced with the ‘big ticket’ ethical dilemmas we typically think of in
ethical discussions – e.g., ‘is abortion morally permissible?’ ‘Should we have a one or
two tier medical public health care system?’ Rather, their concerns are often ‘small’ by
comparison and arise in mundane, everyday situations. E.g., ‘Is it okay to lock Joan in her
bedroom while I slip out for 15 minutes to get groceries for supper?’ ‘Is it okay to lie to
Jim and tell him the stove is not working when he wants to cook and I am afraid he will
hurt himself?’ This does not mean that these ‘small’ issues are unimportant. In fact, quite
the opposite is true. Moreover, dealing with these sorts of issues often gives rise to a great
deal of moral distress and moral residue in caregivers – the feeling that they have been
forced by circumstances to do things they are not completely comfortable doing (See
Jameton, 1984 & Webster and Baylis, 2000). Given the symbiotic relationship between
caregivers and cared for people with dementia, and the importance of the caregiver in the
cared for one’s life, it is absolutely essential to take these sort of issues seriously and to
provide as much support as we can for caregivers (as well as for the people they care for).
We know, e.g., that moral distress in new nurses can lead to all sorts of problems – from
them reducing their work hours or creating a new, ‘more hardened’ identity, to quitting
the profession altogether (B. Kelly, 1986; B. Kelly, 1998). We must make certain that
something similar doesn’t happen to caregivers of people with dementia.
There are hosts of ways in which one can conduct an ethical inquiry. In practical
situations such as this, however, a necessary first step is to collect all the relevant facts. It
is within the context set by these facts that ethical analysis can be productive. Since 1979,
when Beauchamp and Childress first published Principles of Biomedical Ethics,
principlism has often been used to investigate ethical issues in bioethics. Principlism is a
pluralistic theory. That is, under this approach, decisions about ethical issues are made
with reference to a number of basic moral principles rather than just one. Beauchamp and
Childress suggest four such principles: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and

justice. I will follow them in applying these four principles to the situation of treating and
caring for people with dementia.
PRINCIPLISM
Let me briefly explain these four principles before moving on to discuss some of the
relevant facts of dementia. Autonomy literally means ‘self-legislating,’ and is based upon
the power or capacity humans have to make free choices. In a biomedical context, respect
for the principle of autonomy is made most explicit by the requirement that informed
consent must be acquired for all medical interventions either from the person herself
(when she is competent), of from a proxy (when she is not).
Beneficence and Non-maleficence are the opposite sides of the same coin. Nonmaleficience requires, in the words of the Hippocratic Oath, that we do no harm while
beneficence requires us actively to seek positive benefits for our patients.
Justice has both a formal and a substantive aspect. Formally, justice requires that
equals be treated equally; i.e., that we do not engage in arbitrary discrimination against
someone (based, e.g., on their medical condition, gender, etc.). Substantively, theories of
justice can vary quite wildly in terms of the way in which societal benefits and costs are
distributed, from strict egalitarianism (everyone gets exactly the same) to considerations
of those who are most in need or those who have the ability to pay.
SOME FACTS ABOUT DEMENTIA
Obviously, this is a huge area, and I cannot do anything more than point to a few things
that will be relevant to our ethical analysis.
1) Dementia is not simply equivalent to old age. Though a large proportion of people
will develop some form of dementia if they live long enough, dementia also
affects people who are under 65. For example, 200,000 Americans under 65
currently have some form of dementia (Alzheimer’s Association, 2017).
Moreover, it will have very little or no affect on others who live well beyond
normal life expectancy. This is important to remember because it saves us from
brushing aside the notion that dementia is inevitable and that there is little or
nothing to be done for people suffering from it. As I discuss in more detail below,
keeping this fact in mind may help rectify some of the rationale for providing
relatively miniscule amounts of research money on dementia.
2) Dementia is not ‘death that leaves the body behind’, as is often thought. Clearly,
dementia is a horribly incapacitating disease, especially in its latter stages. But
people with dementia, particularly in its milder forms or early stages, and even at
its moderate or middle stage, can do a variety of things that they used to do. And
even though they often have trouble articulating things, this does not mean that
their brain is not functioning at all. Nor does it mean that someone with dementia
can find no positive value in his or her life (Alzheimer’s Society of Canada,
2018).
3) A related point: People with dementia will experience their symptoms quite
differently. We should not, therefore, lump all patients into a single category of
‘dementia patients’ and treat them all in the same manner. Some patients, e.g.,
will be able to participate much more fully in decisions, and find much more
satisfaction in their lives than others.
4) There is currently no simple physiological test to determine the presence of a
dementia. The best diagnostic tool for determining dementia is still a cognitive

memory test. This is one reason why dementia is often not diagnosed as early as
we would like. Moreover, some patients find the cognitive/memory test
disheartening. As one patient put it: “They put me through the whole rigmarole, a
four-hour test that I came out of feeling like a total idiot. You come out thinking,
’Where am I? Who am I?’” (Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 2009, p. 11).
5) The social costs of dementia are staggering. A 2008 study published by the
Canadian Alzheimer Society maintained that the direct costs of dementia in
Canada at that time was $8 billion while the total economic burden on dementia in
Canada was almost $15 billion. Astronomical as these figures are, if nothing
significant happens, those costs are expected to rise to $92 billion and $152
billion respectively by 2038.These figures raise questions about our ability to pay
for dementia care and how to do so efficiently and fairly (Canadian Alzheimer
Society & RiskAnalytica, 2008).
AUTONOMY
As we have moved in the past generation away from a paternalistic model of the patientphysician relationship, autonomy has acquired greater and greater significance. In
general, this has been a good thing. But with reference to people with dementia, the
privileging of autonomy has caused tremendous difficulties because of competency
issues. That is, we often assume that people with dementia cannot make decisions on
their own any longer and so we as professional health care workers or as family
caregivers make decisions for them based on our preferences. There needn’t be any
malicious intent here: indeed, we often make our decisions with the person’s best interest
firmly in mind. But we need to note a number of issues here.
First, denying someone his or her autonomy is typically a harm to that person, no
matter if we are doing what we think is best. As noted by the Leeds, England Christian
Council on Ageing, Faith in Elderly People: “We have noticed that it is too easily
assumed by the decision makers in providing care (as well as generally) that people with
dementia are incapable of making choices and taking decisions (which will have a great
impact on their future well-being), thereby ‘de-humanizing’ them” (cited in Nuffield
Council, 2009, p. 79).
Second, there are a number of ways to conceive of autonomy and some are better
suited to the situation of dealing with people with dementia than others. As noted in a
previous section, autonomy is literally the ability to be self-legislating. Typically, the
emphasis is placed upon the ‘self’, i.e., one acting independently of others using reason as
one’s guide. Both the “independence” and the “rationality” criteria are problematic for
people with dementia. But there are other notions of autonomy that don’t make these
criteria so central. In particular, some feminists have promoted the idea of “relational
autonomy.” Working on some empirical work first carried out by Carol Gilligan, they
have suggested that the traditional view of autonomy is a distinctly male view (Gilligan,
1986). When we compare the ways in which boys and girls develop, we see that while
boys tend to prefer abstract principles and independence, girls tend to favor emotional
commitment and concrete relationships. As a result, Gilligan and others have argued that
emotions and relationships must be considered as an important part of our decision
making capacity since we are who we are within the web of relationships we have – with
family members, with colleagues, with friends, and so. Hence, we ought to think of
autonomy within the context of our relationships with others (See, e.g., Sherwin, 2000).

This is essential in considering people with dementia for as their illness progresses, they
become more and more dependent on others. But this doesn’t mean that they have lost all
autonomy interests. We have to re-conceptualize their choices, though, as ones that are
made jointly. Obviously, this will have tremendous consequences for legal issues as well
as moral ones, and all of this will have to be reexamined as we move forward. The
Nuffield Council on Bioethics has suggested that however we move forward exactly, we
must encourage people with dementia “to retain and express their sense of self, rather
than simply being protected from harm or interference. In order to give this support it is
necessary for those providing care to try to understand what the person with dementia is
feeling, wanting and experiencing,” although this will become increasingly more difficult
as the dementia becomes more severe (Nuffield Council, 2009, p. 27). Hence, as rational
capacity diminishes, we must give more weight to their emotional responses, e.g.,
“enabling them to pursue activities that they appear to enjoy even if they lack the
capacity to make relevant decisions” (Nuffield Council, 2009, p. 27).
NON-MALEFICENCE/BENEFICENCE
It is one thing to say that we ought to do things not to harm and/or to benefit people; it’s
quite another to say what this entails, even on a general level. For example, we could
consider well-being as having to do with a person’s moment-to-moment experiences. On
such an account, promoting maximum well-being or happiness would entail maximizing
the number of such positive experiences, whatever they might turn out to be. On another
account, we might think of human well-being as containing a number of things beyond
one’s immediate experience, and think, e.g., that a person’s rational capacity and/or
ability to act autonomously is an important ingredient in a life that is worth living. On
this account, then, increasing well-being will involve decreasing cognitive impairment as
a way of increasing autonomous capacity. Note, however, that there can be tensions
between these two conceptions of well-being. Consider, e.g., a drug that increased mental
capacity and hence autonomy but decreased a person’s moment by moment experience
by making him more aware of his illness. Juggling these sorts of tensions will require an
empathetic awareness on the part of caregivers (Nuffield Council, 2009, p. 28).
Indeed, there often will be dilemmas faced in caring for people with dementia
between letting a person do what she wants even though doing so presents some risk to
her. As caregivers, we tend to think of safety first, and while this may be appropriate in
many, perhaps most cases, we need also to realize that we must trade off these things.
Just think of your own life. Do you always forgo activities that you desire and enjoy just
because they present some additional risk? Of course in your case now, as a competent
person, you are making that choice, and that is quite different than the case we are
considering here for an incompetent person suffering with dementia. But even so, we can
imagine that were we in their shoes, we wouldn’t want safety – especially minimal
increments of it – always to override everything else, including pleasure. One thing that
considering the principles of autonomy, beneficence and non-maleficence bring into
relief is that the life of the person with dementia is bound thoroughly with his caregivers,
both professionals and family members. Indeed, I think some help can be found here in
drawing an analogy between a lover and a caregiver. We can think of the creation of a
loving couple as altering three basic components of the lovers: their well-being, their
autonomy, and even their identity. In terms of well-being, the pains and pleasures of your
loved one become part of your pains and pleasures. Your happiness is now

interdependent. And the ways in which you make decisions changes as well. You no
longer make them in isolation; rather, decisions, or important ones at least, are made
jointly. As a result of these two fundamental changes, your very identity is altered as
well. This is not to say that your individual self is now completely subsumed within the
new ‘couple’, since there will continue to be room for some independence, but your
identities now overlap and merge in intricate and interesting ways (Nozick, 1989, pp. 6886; Stewart, 2007). I think you can see how this might well extend to the relationship
between caregiver and cared for, though of course there are important differences. But
the analogy brings out the interdependence that occurs in both relationships. It also brings
out the fact that the caregiver’s well-being is fundamentally important to the well-being
of the person with dementia being cared for. Hence, we need to look seriously at ways in
which we can make the work of caregivers more satisfying and less stressful.
Interestingly, this raises issues of the sorts of research on dementia that are carried
out. The first thing to note about this is that the amount of research money devoted to
dementia is paltry when compared to research dollars spent on cancer, stokes and heart
ailments. I’ll come back to this in a moment when considering the principle of justice. I
want now to focus on how the research money on dementia – paltry though it may be -- is
distributed between various sorts of research. Most of it is spent on finding cures for
dementia (or at least slowing its progression), such as pharmacological interventions.
While I don’t want to disparage such research, it’s important to note that in all likelihood,
such research will do nothing or very little for those suffering from dementia now –
especially for those in the latter stages of the disease – nor for their caregivers. These
groups would benefit much more from social science research, which investigated such
areas as: the experience of living with dementia for both caregivers and those cared-for;
the quality of life of people with dementia; social stigma and dementia; how best to
educate caregivers; how to make buildings etc. more ‘dementia friendly’; and cost
effectiveness of alternative forms of support (Nuffield Council, 2009, pp. 129-130).
JUSTICE
As noted at the beginning of this paper, the formal principle of justice requires that equals
be treated equally while substantive theories of justice deal with how societal benefits
and burdens are distributed. There is evidence to support the claim that people suffering
from dementia receive less support than people suffering from other ailments such as
cancer. For example, people with dementia are less likely to have palliative care offered
than people dying from cancer (H-K Huang, et al., 2017). And, according to the British
Geriatrics Society, “the emphasis of resource allocation, prioritization, performance
targets, research funding, education and training has all been skewed towards higher tech
treatments and ‘sexier’ conditions such as cancer and ischaemic heart disease which
affect younger people and away from the needs of older people with incurable long term
conditions” (Quoted in Nuffield Council, 2009, p. 128). For example, and following up
on our earlier discussion about research dollars, a survey in the UK “of research papers
on long-term conditions published since 2002 demonstrated that while 23.5 per cent were
concerned with cancer and 17.6 per cent with cardiovascular diseases, only 1.4 per cent
focused on dementia…. [and] a total of £32.4 million [was] spent in 2007-08 on dementia
[from the Dept. of Health and Medical Research Council], compared with £248.2 million
the same year on cancer (Kapp and Prince, 2007, p. xv).

Part of the problem here may have to do with the fact that dementia patients,
especially when they are afflicted in the later phases of the disease, are mentally
incompetent. This differentiates them from, say, end stage cancer patients who may well
still be competent. This is an especially important issue with respect to “non-therapeutic”
research; i.e., research that will not benefit the research subject him or herself though it
may benefit others suffering from the same disease at some time in the future. Competent
adults are of course allowed to engage in such research studies so long as they are
adequately informed about the study (including that it will not benefit them), and are not
coerced. But incompetent Alzheimer’s patients are not able to consent for themselves,
and having others consent for them is deeply problematic. Ordinarily, proxy consent –
where we are deciding for others – is much more restrictive than consenting for
ourselves. Hence, e.g., though a Jehovah Witness can decline a blood transfusion for him
or herself, if they are a competent adult, they cannot decline the same treatment for their
children who are under the age of consent.
Barry Brown has argued that we can find ways to deal with this, though it requires
some re-thinking, both about notions of autonomy and of well-being. Fortunately, both of
these concepts have already been discussed above. Briefly, one idea is to think of
autonomy in relational terms and to think in particular of the relationship (and good)
between the patient/research subject and those people who are part of the same “disease
community.” The second idea involves thinking of a good/valuable/happy life over a
period of time, and not just as a transitory, moment-by-moment experience. As we shall
see, these two ideas are actually related.
Concerns about doing research on human beings without their consent stemmed
from the revelations of Nazi experiments on Jews and others. Hence, the first principle of
the 1947 Nuremberg Code is that voluntary consent is essential. Of course, people with
advanced stages of dementia are not competent to provide voluntary consent. Proxy
decisions must therefore be made for them by others. As noted earlier, however, there are
restrictions placed on proxy voters that do not exist for competent adults making
decisions over themselves. This is what makes non-therapeutic research problematic for
incompetent research subjects. The possibility Brown raises is whether we can overcome
this by suggesting that while ‘the good’ of society as a whole is too wide a field to justify
non therapeutic research in these circumstances, the good of one’s “disease community”
may offer such justification. This follows, or is at least consistent with a relational view
of autonomy. Brown writes: In one sense “of conceptualizing the relation between the
individual and the group, the good in view is neither that of society as a whole nor that of
a single individual. It involves the group of persons with a condition, such as Alzheimer’s
disease” (Brown, 2012, pp.100-101). Brown continues by quoting John Finnis’
conception of the common good. It is not “the greatest good for the greatest number,” but
a “set of conditions which enables the members of a community to attain for themselves
reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably for themselves, the value(s) for the sake of
which they have reason to collaborate with each other (positively or negatively) in a
community (Quoted in Brown, 2012, p. 101).
The second idea involves thinking of a person over a period of time. My father,
for example, devoted a great deal of his time to volunteering, and a considerable amount
of his self-worth and his very moral identity came from his sense of helping others.
Indeed, so too was his happiness: he enjoyed helping others. Given the opportunity, my

father almost certainly would have volunteered for non-therapeutic research to help
others suffering from Alzheimer’s, either now or in the future. Of course, it would be best
to make wishes such as this formalized while the person is still competent. And health
care institutions have to begin investigating the possibility of getting a (competent)
patient’s wishes on their charts in ways similar to procedures now common for indicating
a patient’s desire not to be resuscitated or to allow a “natural death.” That such wishes are
not formally known, however, should not preclude the possibility of proxy consent when
such consent would be consistent with the character of the now incompetent person.
Indeed, to deny this possibility seems somehow to diminish that person’s autonomy and
their happiness (considered over an extended period of time).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
There are obviously a number of issues that one could raise with respect to the ethics of
caring for people with dementia. I have focused only on a few, and in particular have
suggested that the best care of people with dementia may require slight shifts in our
thinking about how best to conceive of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and
justice in relation to this care.
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